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ABSTRACT 
 
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia provides for an executive centric mechanism in judicial appointment 
where the Prime Minister has the final say. To make matter worse for this executive dominance, a commission 
of enquiry found that parties that should not have a say in judicial appointment managed to drown the Chief 
Justice’s voice in proposing names of candidates to the Prime Minister. The finding of this commission 
compelled the government to form a Judicial Appointment Commission in improving the independence, 
integrity and accountability of the judiciary. This article seeks to examine the impetus of this reform and to 
explore the suitability of the principles adopted in the working of the Commission to achieve the stated 
objectives. 
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Introduction 
 
Judiciary is indispensible in the healthy functioning of a state, particularly one that believes in the rights of 
the governed. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights requires a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. The Malaysian Constitution that provides one 
part guaranteeing fundamental liberties, likewise albeit implicitly, demands the same criteria of a tribunal. 
Furthermore, the extensive power held by the combined might of the executive and the legislature in a 
Westminster style of government as adopted in Malaysia requires not less than a strong and independent 
judiciary. If the judiciary also falls to the lure of power and greed, then all are doomed. 
Judges must as far as humanly possible, be made fair and independent of the executive in the discharge of 
their duties in order to ensure that the will, liberties and rights of individuals are ensured against the 
encroachment of tyranny. It is also important for a society to have an impartial judiciary because the judiciary is 
the hope of the hopeless and voice of the voiceless in the society. When more cases relating to fundamental 
liberties are brought to the courts, judges’ position gains more importance. Disputes between individuals, 
between the have and have not, the weak and the powerful, and between the governments at various levels 
requires judges of the highest calibre and integrity. To ensure one has an independent judiciary to decide such 
cases, it has to start with correct appointment process. One factor in ensuring a capable and independent judge is 
by ensuring appointment of judges with integrity. His qualification will be “badges of legitimacy” for the 
judiciary Malleson, Kate & Russell, Peter 2006).   
 
Decay in the Malaysian Judiciary: 
 
The reason for the reform of judicial appointment should be rooted on the need to guarantee the 
independence of the judiciary, to divorce it from party politics and to ensure the best candidate for the job 
(Malleson, Kate 2004). Looking from this perspective, one could relate the reform in Malaysia with the decay in 
the Malaysian judiciary beginning with the removal of Tun Salleh Abbas, the then Lord President, in 1988. 
Politics could be an invigorating process where a sense of purpose and passion could be instilled. It also could 
be toxic, weakening structures and organisation. When politicians resort to the court to solve political infighting, 
judges may be caught in between.  
For most observers, this is what started the trouble with the Malaysian judiciary beginning in the 1980’s. 
Power struggles within the main political party that have held power since the Independence in 1957, namely 
the United Malay National Union (UMNO), was brought to the court when members of the party challenged 
results of the party election. The courts were again caught in the web of a political power struggle when the then 
Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad in 1997 considered Anwar Ibrahim to be morally unfit to be the next 
Prime Minister. He was tried for, among others, corruption. His trials were controversial leaving bystander 
becoming highly cynical of the administration of justice (Lee, 1995). 
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This turmoil in administration of justice was not helped by the questionable conducts of judges. Pictures of 
a judge and a prominent lawyer holidaying together with their families made its ways into the internet. There 
were allegation of involvement of third parties in appointment and promotion of judges. These whispers about 
unsavoury dealings turned mainstream when the “VK Lingam Tape” surfaced on the internet in September 
2007. The video clip shows images of a prominent lawyer engaged in a telephone conversation with a high 
ranking judicial officer in relation to appointment and promotion of judges. 
To his credit, the Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Abdullah Badawi decided to tackle the debacle head on by 
forming a panel headed by Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Haidar Mohamed Noor to verify the authenticity of the video clip. 
In November 2007, the panel recommended the setting up of a Commission of Enquiry. Prime Minister 
Abdullah Badawi adviced the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to establish the Commission, and in 12 December 2007, a 
Commission of Enquiry was formed headed by Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Haidar Mohamed Noor. The Commission 
was entrusted to determine the authenticity of the tape, to identify the parties in the video clip, to ascertain the 
truth of the content of the conversation, to determine whether any misbehaviour has been committed and to 
recommend course of action against the identified persons 
The Commission submitted its report in May 2008. It found the video clip to be authentic, the man in the 
clip is Dato’ VK Lingam (a prominent lawyer) and he was speaking with Tun Ahmad Fairuz (a former Chief 
Justice). The Commission recommended that action to be brought against the individuals under the provisions 
on official secrecy (on the breach of secrecy of communication between a Chief Justice and the Prime Minister) 
under the Penal Code. 
Regarding judicial appointment, the Commission found element of political patronage where the lawyer 
“was actively involved” in the promotion of a former Chief Justice together with a prominent businessman and a 
Deputy Minister (Prime Minister’s Department, 2008). Tun Mahathir, the then Prime Minister who has the 
constitutional power to advise the King (the Yang di-Pertuan Agong), (Federal Constitution, art. 122B(1) 
admitted the possibility of him receiving advice regarding judicial appointment from his acquaintance. 
However, he reiterated that he alone made the final decision and called it as his “prerogative.” With the above in 
mind, the Commission recommended for a judicial commission to be formed so that the process of judicial 
appointment is more transparent.  
 
The Judicial Appointment Process: 
 
The Federal Constitution provides that judges of the High Courts, the Court of Appeal and the Federal 
Court are to be appointed by “the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after 
consulting the Conference of Rulers”. For judges other than the Chief Justice, the Prime Minister should consult 
the Chief Justice before tendering his advice. Reading this provision together with the provision that requires the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to accept and act in accordance with advice, it appears that, legally, the Prime Minister 
has the final say in judicial appointment. This point was extended when the Federal Court declared that the 
Prime Minister can even disregard any views from the Conference of Rulers that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
had to consult. (Re Application by Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim to Disqualify a Judge of the Court of Appeal ). 
This executive dominance reflected by Tun Mahathir in giving his evidence before the Commission of Enquiry 
where he readily repeated the same line that irrespective of whomever he consults or consulted him; he is, as the 
Prime Minister, who makes the final decision.  
The evidence before the Commission of Enquiry from those who cruise the corridor of power was a 
revelation to the inner world of judicial appointment which was not privy to ordinary mortals. It transpired that 
the Chief Secretary of State, a name that could not be found in the relevant constitutional provisions regarding 
judicial appointment, may even end up as the one that supplies the name to the Prime Minister. Conversely, the 
Chief Justice, a name found in relevant constitutional provision, may, in tendering suggestions for promotion 
and appointment of judges, be at the mercy of others. 
 
Aftermath of the Enquiry: 
 
The government made haste in riding through public opinion that saw irregularity in appointment and 
promotion of judges while the Commission of Enquiry was deliberating. In April 2008, the government made 
ex-gratia payment to Tun Salleh Abas and other judges that were removed from office by the tribunals set up in 
1987. 
The phrase “it looks like me, sounds like me, but it’s not me” taken from a witness who continuously 
refused to admit that he was the one in the video clip became a depiction of the sorry state of the judiciary that 
refuse to admit the problem within. 
As the Commission of Enquiry found that the appointment and promotion of judges “is open to interference 
and manipulation by the Executive and other extrinsic forces including private citizens”, the Commission 
proposed a judicial appointment commission to be set up. It does not delve much further than that in its 
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proposal. Doubt was caste whether Abdullah Badawi’s administration will take up this proposal. His hasten 
schedule of transfer of power to Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak and the desire to leave a lasting legacy prove to be 
blessing in disguise for tabling schedule of a bill to establish a judicial appointment commission. 
The Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi in early 2008 admitted that the level of trust and respect for the 
judiciary is low because of the perceived corruption and decline in quality. The Minister in charge of law at the 
time of the second reading of the Judicial Appointment Commission Bill said that the tabling of the bill is the 
first step to get back the trust of the people on the judicial appointment process under the principle of the 
independence of the judiciary. The long title of the Judicial Appointment Commission Act 2009 also declares 
that the Act is to provide “the continued independence of the judiciary”.  
Perhaps the impetus to form a judicial appointment commission could be compared with other countries. In 
England for instance, the reason for the establishment of a judicial appointment commission was not because the 
then existing system to be found corrupt or being abuse but to gain public confidence in the independence of the 
judiciary. This distinction perhaps explains the piecemeal approach taken by Malaysia compared with England. 
However, one could not argue against the Malaysian reform by saying “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it”. 
 
Membership of the Commission: 
 
The Judicial Appointment Commission Act 2009 received its Royal Assent in January 2009. The 
Commission consists of five serving judges and four “eminent persons”. Much discussion in the legislative 
assembly centred on who this “eminent persons” are. Suggestions were made to define phrase, something which 
the Act fails to define. 
Members of the Commission consists of the higher echelon of serving judges namely the Chief Justice, the 
President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judges of the High Courts and a Federal Court judge appointed by 
the Prime Minister. Apart from serving judges, four “eminent persons” are appointed by the Prime Minister. The 
four persons must not be a member of the executive or public service. Private lawyer’s bodies are involved in 
the appointment of these four persons by requiring the Prime Minister to consult the Bar Council and the law 
associations in Sabah and Sarawak.  
Apart from those who are members by virtue of their office, members of the commission hold office for 
two years and not more than two terms. The perception that the Commission exist and continue to exist at the 
behest of the Prime Minister is exemplified by the power of the Prime Minister to remove any member. 
Although similar Commission in England also provide power of the government to recommend to Her Majesty 
to remove a Commissioner, the law provides specific grounds of removal such as being unfit to hold his office. 
Additionally, in Malaysia, it is the Prime Minister that appoints the Commissioners, not the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong. 
Criticisms were made against cronyism and favouritism in judicial appointments. The Act addresses this 
issue by specifically barring a member of Commission from being involve in decision making if a candidate 
being considered is “related and connected” to the member. Apart from family relation, the Act includes a 
nominee, a partner of a firm or a trustee of his family trust. It is an offence to fail to disclose such an interest. 
Unfortunately, if the intention of the Commission is to introduce diversity in the appointing authority, then 
sadly it has not achieved its objective. The Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi appointed three retired judges and a 
former Attorney-General to fill in the seat for four “eminent persons”. Thus, the membership is weight heavily 
to the judiciary: eight against one. There is no representation from lay persons, academicians or lawyers 
contrary to an indication given by the Minister in charge of the reform, Zaid Ibrahim. There will then be a 
tendency for the members of the commission to replicate themselves in the appointment and to rely on the old 
boys’ network. 
In appointing four eminent persons, the Act provides for consultation with the Bar Council and other 
relevant bodies. The Bar Council complained that they only had the opportunity to provide names but was 
denied further consultation. For them, consultation should mean more than giving a list of names. 
In England, the law ensures that panel of selection will consist, apart from judicial officers, lay members. 
Inclusion of members with different backgrounds will broaden expertise and inject fresh views in the 
appointment process. It even provides that the Chairman must be a lay member. By composition, the 
Commission consists of judicial officers, practicing lawyers and five lay members apart from the Chairman. 
This is in stark contrast to the composition provided in the Malaysian Act and the actual appointment of 
members made by the Prime Minister.  
 
Functions and Powers: 
 
The Commission of Enquiry had criticised that the appointment process is not transparent leaving the 
possibility of other parties intruding in the appointment process. The Judicial Appointment Commission is to 
strive towards changing this. However, one should not have the wrong idea that now it is the Commission that 
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appoint judges and the judicial appointment process is taken away from the hand of the executive. The function 
of the Commission is only to propose candidates for the Prime Minister to consider. Perhaps the name Judicial 
Advisory Appointment Commission, as the Committee in Ontario Canada, is more apt for the Commission. 
The core power of the Commission is to provide a list of candidates for the Prime Minister to consider. The 
Prime Minister may disagree with the suggested name and request another list. Since there is no limit to how 
many times the Prime Minister may disagree, he may wait until a name that he agrees comes out. 
In contrast, the Judicial Appointment Commission in England must provide only one name. Thus, the 
government either may take it or leave it. The government could only decline once. The second time the 
Commission provides a name; the government has no option but to accept it. This limits the ability of the 
government to reject the candidate selected by the Commission. 
The law provides that the Commission may receive application from qualified persons to be selected as 
judges. This is a new move by allowing application to be made directly for judicial post. This will widen the 
pool of candidates to be considered. Perhaps if the Commission would like to increase the number of applicant 
from a certain group, such as from women, invitation may be sent to qualified women to apply for the post. 
The Prime Minister may reject the candidate of the Commission without ascribing any reason. 
Consequently, he may reject it on any ground. Conversely, the English Act restricts the power to reject the 
candidate on the ground that there is not enough evidence that the candidate is suitable or there is evidence that 
the person is not the best candidate on merit. The candidate could not be rejected on only any flimsy grounds or 
without grounds as happened when Tun Mahathir rejected proposed names from the Chief Justice. 
It seems that functions of the Commission are not confined preparing a list of candidates to be considered 
by the Prime Minister. The Commission may propose programmes to the Prime Minister “to improve the 
administration of justice” and “other recommendations about the judiciary”. The wording is open ended and 
provides a wide purview of the Commission in making recommendation regarding programmes to the 
betterment of the judiciary and administration of justice. This is commendable. However, it remains to be seen 
how actually the Commission takes advantage of this role to help the judiciary. 
 
Qualification of Judges: 
 
Previously, there is no mention of qualification of a judge except that he must be a citizen and has been a 
private or public lawyer for ten years. The 2009 Act provides that the Commission has to consider, among 
others, integrity, competency, impartiality, moral character, legal writing skill and case management. This is in 
line with the qualification stated in the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary endorsed by the 
General Assembly of the United Nation and the Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the 
Judiciary. 
Although the Commission in England for instance only provides the selection should be based on merit and 
the candidate of good character, the reason why specific qualifications such as legal writing skill are mentioned 
has to be understood from series of controversies regarding independence and competency of judges. It was 
revealed for instance that some judges who had failed to deliver written judgment were nevertheless promoted. 
Thus, although some of the qualifications seem to be petty, in the past what is obviously an important 
quality seems to be lost to the appointing authority. This explains the need to put explicitly such criteria. 
 
The Changes: 
 
Members of Parliament in debating this Act had raised the issue of whether the Judicial Appointment 
Commission is enough to solve the problem as couched by the Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi - the perceived 
corruption and decline in quality. Looking at the provision as a whole, much still depends on the person of the 
Prime Minister. In other words, nothing changes. 
The Federal Constitution provides that before the Prime Minister tenders his advice to the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong to appoint judges, he has to consult the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice is a member and the chairperson 
of the Commission. The Act also provides that when the Prime Minster accepted any of the persons 
recommended by the Commission, he may tender his advice to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Thus, rather than 
consulting a person, now the Prime Minister consult the Commission.  
This arrangement is certainly better since indirectly the consultation is expanded to other judicial officers 
and “eminent persons”. However, since the “eminent persons” appointed consist of retired judges, consultation 
still confine to the judiciary. The Prime Minister is getting recommendation from the same group of people with 
the Chief Justice. 
Additionally, apart from the four judicial officers who are members by their post, other members are 
appointed by the Prime Minister and may be removed as members by the Prime Minister. To avoid the 
appearance that the members are at the mercy of the Prime Minister, specific grounds may be given for the 
removal. This is in line with the intention to instil transparency in the whole appointment process. 
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If the intent is to divorce the appointment process of the judiciary from intervention of the political 
executive, then nothing changes. The role of the Commission is to provide a report which contains the 
recommended candidate for the post. The Prime Minister may request more names for his consideration. In 
other words, he may reject the Commission’s recommendations, albeit by asking the Commission to submit 
another. If elucidated in the Commission of Enquiry, this happened when the then Chief Justice Dzaiddin 
recommended Justice Abdul Malek Ahmad to the post of Chief of Malaya but was rejected by the Prime 
Minister. The Prime Minister in turn suggested for the Chief Justice to recommend Justice Ahmad Fairuz to the 
post which the Chief Justice duly complied and the candidate was duly appointed. 
The Judicial Appointment Commission does not change much the previous process. This may be caused by 
lack of political will to make “drastic change” as put forward by the British government in the consultation 
paper. To be fair to the government, there may be another reason for this incremental reform. It relates to 
reducing majority seats held by the ruling coalition in the aftermath of the year 2004 general election where the 
coalition failed to maintain a two third majority of seats in the House of Representative. In contrast to England, 
a reform of judicial appointment could not be done solely through enacting ordinary laws. Constitutional 
provisions regarding the Head of State, the Conference of Rulers and the special rights of State of Sabah and 
State of Sarawak need to be taken into account. The Federal Constitution provides that the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong after receiving advice from the Prime Minister consult the Conference of Rulers. Before tendering his 
advice, the Prime Minister must consult the Chief Ministers of Sabah and Sarawak for the appointment Chief 
Judge of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak. 
Thus, the government may be hesitant in providing wider reform that could only be affected by 
constitutional amendments which requires the support of the opposition since the coalition party in party, 
namely the Coalition Front, failed to retain two third majority of the seat in the House of Representative after 
the 2008 General Election. Although the Opposition invited the government to make necessary constitutional 
amendments which they will support, the government rejected this overture because of the government 
reportedly could not trust the word of the Opposition.  
The setting up of the Commission has indeed been challenged in Robert Linggi where the petitioner 
challenged the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that, among others, it changes the appointment 
procedure under the Federal Constitution. The High Court in return observed that the Judicial Appointment 
Commission only recommends qualified candidates for judgeship and the discretion of the Prime Minister in 
submitting a particular name to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong remains. Thus, the Act does not change the 
constitutional procedure in judicial appointment.  
 
Concluding Remarks: 
 
Public poise in the courts and their pronouncements depend on a common discernment that judges are 
independent and that those appointed are the best candidates available. That means the judicial appointment 
practice should be open, transparent and apolitical. Candidates should be assessed in terms of their 
independence, ability, professionalism and integrity. The proposals in Britain which had been carried out are an 
example of what would inject a welcome level of independence and scrutiny into the process. 
The setting up of the Judicial Appointment Commission is a step in the right direction of improving the 
state of the judiciary in Malaysia. Considering the political climate, it is a bold move by the government. It 
provides the initial step towards a more transparent judicial appointment. However, the centre of power still 
resides with the Prime Minister. Thus, the breach of separation of powers is not considered an important issue, 
or alternatively, it is not considered as an issue that should need a second thought. 
In this paper, comparison was made with the Judicial Appointment Commission in England to provide 
possible improvement to the existing Act. This does not mean that a Malaysian commission has to be a replica 
of a commission of another country. A commission has to be able to adapt and accommodate “particular legal, 
political and cultural conditions” of a country. Nevertheless, it is not a waste to learn lessons from others. 
One point of concern though as far as the Malaysian Judicial Appointment Committee is concerned, is that 
the main function of the Commission is to provide a list of candidates for the Prime Minister to consider. What 
is striking is that the Prime Minister may disagree with the suggested name and request another list. This may be 
fair enough, however, what is more alarming is that since there is no limit to how many times the Prime 
Minister may disagree, he may wait until a name that he agrees comes out, frustrating the essence whole process 
altogether. If that is the case, much like the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission of Hong Kong or 
the Judicial Appointment of Advisory Committee of Ontario Canada, the name of the Malaysian Commission 
should have reflected its true mandate. On the other hand, lessons may be seen in the English Act which restricts 
the power to reject the candidate on the ground that there is not enough evidence that the candidate is suitable or 
there is evidence that the person is not the best candidate on merit.  
One thing that is encouraging however, is the 2009 Act’s prescription of qualities in a Judge that the 
Commission has to consider such as integrity, competency, impartiality, moral character, legal writing skill and 
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case management. And what we cannot ignore is the fact that Malaysia may now be seen as a country 
embracing a wave of judicial reform which has been sweeping across the globe in the recent decade. It may not 
be there altogether just yet, but it is a step in the right direction. Whether the setting up of the Judicial 
Appointments Commission has put to rest the ghost of 1988, the jury is still out.  
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